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Self-Determination in Dispute System Design
and Employment Arbitration
By
LISA B. BINGHAM*
INTRODUCTION
A private civil justice system is evolving, one that is relatively
unconstrained by law and relatively uninformed by systematic empirical
research. There are a variety of appropriate metaphors, even sound bites,
to describe the current state of dispute resolution. Some call it "Wild
West Justice."' This captures the notion of a dispute resolution frontier,
one where justice is ad hoc. It also identifies emerging systems as
existing in a state before civilization arrives, a state in which the strong
and well-armed have certain distinct advantages. Another related meta-
phor is "Dispute Resolution Darwinism."2 In its best light, this is often
cast as allowing the bloom of one thousand conflict resolution
processes.' In theory, time will tell which process or system of
processes is the "fittest.
We may already be witnessing the first mass extinction as large
institutional organisms move in to occupy entire habitats in the civil
justice ecosystem. For example, employers, sellers of consumer goods,
banks, HMOs, and other institutional players in the economy are using
adhesive arbitration clauses, and courts are enforcing them,4 despite the
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I thank Professors Ian Ayres, Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Edwin Greenebaum, Harry Mazzadoorian,
Susan Summers Raines, and Leonard Riskin for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this work.
This paper is an outgrowth of work presented at the Quinnipiac/Yale Workshop on Dispute
Resolution. This work was supported in part by a grant from the William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation to the Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute, Indiana University School of Public and
Environmental Affairs, Bloomington, Indiana. Any errors are my own.
1. James F. Henry, Some Reflections on ADR, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 63, 68.
2. A. Nancy Welsh, All in the Family: Darwin and the Evolution of Mediation, 7 Disp.
Resol. Mag. 20 (2001) (discussing the evolution of various models of mediation).
3. Frank E.A. Sander, The Future of ADR, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 3, 4. Professor Sander uses
the metaphor to refer to the period 1975-1982. One could argue, however, that there have been
two separate contexts in which we have experienced this evolutionary springtime. The first was
within court systems and the judicial branch; the current spring is within companies,
organizations, public agencies, and the executive branch.
4. A comprehensive review of the relevant case law is outside the scope of this article. See
generally The Harvard Law Review Ass'n, Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil
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criticisms of many commentators.5 The arbitration clauses in turn can
Litigation: ADR, the Judiciary, and Justice: Coming to Terms with the Alternatives, 113 HARv. L.
REV. 1753, 1851 (2000) (exploring developments of ADR generally, with attention to judicial use
of ADR); RICHARD BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT (1997); David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the
Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73 (1999) (reviewing enforceability of adhesive arbitration
clauses and arguing in favor of mandatory arbitration, provided there are certain reforms); Samuel
Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1344 (1997) (reviewing enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements and arguing that a
well-designed private arbitration alternative for employment claims is in the public interest);
Catherine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming: Systematizing Corporate Use of ADR, 59 ALB. L. REV.
847 (1996) (tracing expanded use of ADR within business world); Joseph T. McLaughlin,
Arbitrability: Current Trends in the United States, 59 ALB. L. REV. 905 (1996) (observing that
United States courts will enforce almost all arbitration agreements, regardless of the claims
genesis as a statutory or non-statutory dispute); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532
U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that employment contracts are not exempt from the Federal Arbitration
Act unless they pertain to transportation workers); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681 (1996) (holding that an arbitration clause in a franchise agreement was enforceable and that
the Federal Arbitration Act preempted a state statute that voided the clause); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (reading the Federal Arbitration Act broadly and
holding that an arbitration clause was enforceable in all interstate commerce); Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act
preempts state law and securities arbitration clauses allow arbitrators to award punitive damages);
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that an arbitration
agreement in a securities representative registration document requires claim brought under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act to be subject to arbitration); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that an arbitration clause in a
distribution and sales agreement was enforceable). But see Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr.
2d 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that customers did not consent to bank's unilateral
imposition of ADR clause by accepting change of terms provision in credit account contract).
5. See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer
Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REv. 1237 (2001) (arguing that for consumers, the
realities of arbitration differ from its idealized benefits); Sarah R. Cole, Uniform Arbitration:
"One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 759 (2001) (arguing for reform
of mandatory arbitration to protect one-shot players such as employees, consumers, insureds,
victims of torts, and patients); Sidney Charlotte Reynolds, Closing a Discrimination Loophole:
Using Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision to Prevent Employers from Requiring Unlawful
Arbitration Agreements as Conditions of Continued Employment, 76 WASH. L. REV. 957 (arguing
against mandatory arbitration); Ronald Turner, Employment Discrimination, Labor and
Employment Arbitration, and the Case Against Union Waiver of the Individual Worker's Statutory
Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORY L.J. 135 (2000) (arguing that unions should not be permitted
to negotiate mandatory arbitration of individual discrimination claims, and criticizing
development of mandatory arbitration); Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative
Dispute Resolution or Coercive Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131 (1996)
(arguing that mandatory arbitration of employment disputes tramples employee rights and thus
contracts with such mandatory provisions should be voidable); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives
and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between
Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996) [hereinafter Cole, Incentives and
Arbitration]; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Ildividual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996) [hereinafter
Stone, Yellow Dog Contract] (arguing that workers' de jure rights cannot be enforced through
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration systems and advocating legislative proposals to reverse the
trend toward privatizing employment rights); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:
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displace voluntary conflict resolution, or even court- or agency-annexed
mediation processes. Lawyers are replacing non-lawyer dispute resolv-
ers. 6 State court efforts to regulate mediation in the courts have led to
certification requirements that displace non-lawyers, 7 and also to debates
Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637
(1996) [hereinafter Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?] (criticizing the Supreme Court's
preference for arbitration because allowing adhesive arbitration clauses permits "stronger parties
to take advantage of weaker parties" and noting that "[a] General Accounting Office report
concluded that most arbitrators who decided employment discrimination cases brought against the
securities industry were white males with an average age of 60") (citing General Accounting
Office, Pub. No. GAO/HEHS-94-17, Employment Discrimination: How Registered
Representatives Fare in Discrimination Disputes 2 (1994)); Jean R. Stemlight, Focus, Simplicity
vs. Fairness in Arbitration: Steps Need to Be Taken to Prevent Unfairness to Employees,
Consumers, 5 No. 1 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 5 (1998) [hereinafter Sternlight, Simplicity vs. Fairness]
(discussing the increased use of adhesive arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and arguing
that the public may not be "better off' because of the trend); Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?,
1993 J. Disp. RESOL. I (criticizing mechanisms that coerce parties to participate in ADR as
inconsistent with ADR's philosophy of voluntariness).
6. Maureen E. Laflin, Preserving the Integrity of Mediation Through the Adoption of Ethical
Rules for Lawyer-Mediators, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'Y 479 (2000) (noting an
increase in the number of lawyer-mediators and arguing for ethical rules specifically targeted at
this group); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's
Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (1998); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, New Roles: Problem Solving:
The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in
Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785 (1999) (analyzing the expanding role of lawyers as dispute
resolvers); Louis J. Weber, Court-Referred ADR and the Lawyer-Mediator: In Service of Whom?,
46 SMU L. REV. 2113 (1993) (describing court-referred ADR as an "additional" dispute
resolution mechanism, an "add-on" procedure, and calling for the return to ADR as a public
service, away from its current direction as a vehicle of profit for greedy lawyers scrambling in a
depressed market).
7. Laflin, supra note 6, at 485 n.21 ("Most federal district courts and at least eight states
require that mediators in civil cases be licensed attorneys .... The states include: Delaware ....
Florida .... Idaho. ... Indiana.... Louisiana .... Michigan .... Montana.... South Carolina ....
and Washington D.C."); Stephanie A. Henning, Note, A Framework for Developing Mediator
Certification Programs, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 189 (1999) (arguing that certification
requirements should focus on training and performance tests, and avoid basing requirements on
professional background or advanced degrees because limiting mediators to lawyers and
psychologists reduces the amount of innovation and diversity in the mediation field); Dana Shaw,
Comment, Mediation Certification: An Analysis of the Aspects of Mediator Certification and an
Outlook on the Trend of Formulating Qualifications for Mediators, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 327 (1998)
(advocating a need for mediator certification requirements and supporting National Standards for
Court-Connected Mediation Programs created by the Center for Dispute Settlement and the
Institute of Judicial Administration); Weber, supra note 6, at 2115 (describing court-referred ADR
as an "add-on" procedure and calling for the return to ADR as a public service, away from its
current direction as a vehicle of profit for greedy lawyers scrambling in a depressed market);
Elizabeth Plapinger & Donna Stienstra, Federal Court ADR: A Practitioner's Update, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 7 (1996) ("Almost all federal courts, and many state courts,
offer litigants at least one ADR process; some have a full array of ADR options."); see also Local
Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York
Local Civil Rules, S. & E.D. N.Y. U.S.D.C. Civil L.R. 83.12 (2000) (providing that a potential
mediator must be member of any state bar or D.C. bar); Rules of Practice and Procedure for
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over the unauthorized practice of law.8 The Dispute Resolution Section
of the American Bar Association is the fastest growing section of the
bar,9 open to lawyer and non-lawyer dispute resolvers alike. It has a
policy that the field is broad enough for both kinds of professionals.
Nevertheless, professional associations representing non-lawyer dispute
resolvers, the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution, and the
Academy of Family Mediators, have merged to form the Association for
Conflict Resolution, t° in the hope that this larger, stronger life form can
hold its own in the competition for habitat. In the face of this mass
extinction, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the fittest
dispute resolution systems will survive, the question remains: fittest for
what?
Most dispute resolvers function like the Lone Ranger, another use-
ful metaphor. They ride in, solve the conflict, save the day, and depart,
leaving the parties to wonder: "Who was that masked neutral?" Usually,
these lone rangers take the dispute system design as they find it. They do
not participate in creating 'it. Usually, they do not have many cases
within a single system, so they do not develop a larger perspective. If
they have more than one case, they may have isolated snapshots of the
system instead of the whole, continuously-moving picture. They rely on
codes of ethics and voluntary standards of professional conduct to police
the system.'' However, conflict of interest rules, particularly for lawyer-
Contested Cases Under the Oregon Safe Employment Act, Jurisdiction over Appeals: Untimely
Appeals, Mediator Qualifications, OR. ADMIN. R. 438-085-0210 (2000).
8. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 57 (1996) (suggesting mediation is practicing law, especially in "evaluative
mediation" in which legal predictions are made or settlements are drafted); Geetha Ravindra, State
ADR: Balancing Mediation with Rules on Unauthorized Practice, 18 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 21 (2000) (arguing mediation is practicing law and discussing general guidelines to
assist mediators to avoid the practice of law when mediating disputes); Bruce Meyerson, ADR
Ethics Forum: Mediation Should Not Be Considered the Practice of Law, 18 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 107 (2000) (arguing that mediation is not practicing law because mediators are
neutral and not serving a "client's interest alone").
9. American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution, ABA Section of Dispute
Resolution Annual Report 1998-1999, at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/yrend99.html (last visited
July 15, 2002) (noting that the Dispute Resolution Section posted the highest growth rate of any in
the American Bar Association).
10. Jerome 0. Pitt, Conflict Resolution Organizations to Merge, IND. LAW., July 5, 2000, at
II (discussing merger of Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR), the Academy of
Family Mediators (AFM), and the Conflict Resolution Education Network (CREnet)); Conflict
Resolution Education Network, Historic $2.45 Million Grant Awarded for Merger of AFM,
CREnet and SPIDR, at http://www.crenet.org/AboutCRENet/confed.htm (last visited July 15,
2002) (announcing merger plan and schedule). See Internet homepage of the Association for
Conflict Resolution, at http://www.acresolution.org (last visited July 15, 2002).
I1. Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary Norms
Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L. 1289 (1998) (discussing
standards created by private firms and courts for alternative dispute resolution proceedings);
[Vol. 56:873
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dispute resolvers,' 2 have driven them into isolating solo practice, where
it is easy to lose perspective on how one neutral's experiences relate to
the evolving systems. Neutrals discuss how to get through impasse or
render solvable the intractable. 3 Some of the talk is about the edge at
which the public civil justice system regulates what neutrals do; thus,
the proposed Uniform Mediation Act 4 and the revision of the Uniform
Tanya A. Yatsco, Comment, How About a Real Answer? Mandatory Arbitration as a Condition of
Employment and the National Labor Relations Board's Stance, 62 ALB. L. REV. 257, 281 (1998)
(calling the Due Process Protocol an "excellent beginning" to help standardize arbitration); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Professional Responsibility for Third Party Neutrals, 11 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITiG. 129 (1993) (suggesting a need for ABA Model Rules to include a code of ethics
for third-party neutrals including: conflicts of interest, bias, impartiality, fees, party counseling,
disclosure, and information); Laflin, supra note 6, at 479 (advocating need for uniform rules
applying to mediators, especially lawyer-mediators); see also American Arbitration Association,
Commercial Dispute Resolution Procedures, at http://www.adr.org/ (last visited July 15, 2002);
American Arbitration Association, National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes, at
http://www.adr.org/ (last visited July 15, 2002); CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, CPR Rules
for Non-Administered Arbitration, at http://www.cpradr.org/ (last visited July 15, 2002); CPR
Institute for Dispute Resolution, Principles for ADR Provider Organizations (draft for comment,
June 2000), at http://www.cpradr.org/ (last visited July 15, 2002).
12. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts
Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871 (1997) (advocating strict conflict of
interest rules and the need to prevent lawyers from representing one of the parties from a
mediation over which he presided); Amanda K. Esquibel, The Case of the Conflicted Mediator:
An Argument for Liability and Against Immunity, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 131, 172 (1999) (arguing that
conflicted mediators should not have immunity "because it cuts off avenues of truth seeking and
redress"); Michelle D. Gaines, A Proposed Conflict of Interest Rule for Attorney-Mediators, 73
WASH. L. REV. 699, 700, 729 (1998) (proposing conflict of interest rule for attorney-mediators
that "protects the parties to mediation, preserves public acceptance of mediation, and encourages
attorneys to practice mediation," and "should be adopted as part of the Rules of Professional
Conduct in all states").
13. See generally Howard Gadlin & Elizabeth Walsh Pino, Neutrality: A Guide for the
Organizational Ombudsperson, 13 NEGOT. J. 17 (1997) (discussing techniques to maintain the
ombudsperson's appearance of neutrality); Kenneth Kressel, Practice-Relevant Research in
Mediation: Toward a Reflective Research Paradigm, 13 NEGOT. J. 143 (1997) (advocating greater
use of reflective analysis for mediation research as opposed to traditional empirical research
methods through a case study of divorce mediation and citing from the works of Donald Schon);
Don Peters, Mapping, Modeling, and Critiquing: Facilitating Learning Negotiation, Mediation,
Interviewing, and Counseling, 48 FLA. L. REV. 875 (1996) (advocating use of reflective learning
for law students, especially for interviewing, counseling, and mediation skills through contact with
practicing attorneys); Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive
Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 389-90 (1995) (drawing analogies
between Donald Schon's theories on reflective practice and current knowledge of cognitive
science, and advocating greater use of reflective analysis in legal education).
14. Bridget Genteman Hoy, Comment, The Draft Uniform Mediation Act in Context: Can it
Clear up the Clutter?, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1121, 1123 (2000) (arguing that the intent of the
Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) is "commendable," but it "may fail to unify the states on all
salient issues, it inappropriately applies to private mediation [and] its broad applicability may
prevent it from clearing up the clutter of mediation regulation"); Mindy D. Rufenacht, Comment,
The Concern Over Confidentiality in Mediation-An In-Depth Look at the Protection Provided by
the Proposed Uniform Mediation Act, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 113, 134 (arguing that the UMA's
confidentiality provision "will provide adequate protection for all parties involved in mediation");
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Arbitration Act have both generated substantial debate at conferences."
Relatively little discussion addresses evolving dispute resolution
systems. The story of six blind people and the elephant is another apt
metaphor for neutrals as lone rangers. Each can feel some piece of the
mammoth alternative dispute resolution (ADR) field, but none can get a
grip on the whole. Instead, there is substantial argument about the right
way, and the wrong way, to practice. Most commentary addresses dis-
pute resolution at the case level.
Nevertheless, there is some excellent work examining systemic
issues. A small, brave band toils in the field of voluntary protocols, set-
ting best practices standards such as those for integrated conflict man-
agement system design, broader codes of ethics for third party providers
of neutrals, and other means of self-regulation for a field that knows no
single professional or disciplinary home. 6 These happy few attempt to
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Draft Uniform Mediation Act,
available at http://www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/uma/ (last visited July 15, 2002) (containing
information about the reasons for drafting the UMA and information about the process).
15. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra note 14;
Departments, ADR News, Revised UAA Adopted, 55-Oct. Disp. RESOL. J. 6 (2000) ("National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ('NCCUSL') voted overwhelmingly to
adopt the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act ('RUAA')."); Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore
Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 58-59 (1999) (advocating
contract model of arbitration and discussing AAA's opposition to "judicialized arbitration" in
revision of the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA)); Resources, A Summary of a Recent Committee
Document on the RUAA, II WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 84 (2000) (discussing RUAA,
motivations of the drafting committee, and recent court decisions impacting the revision process);
Timothy J. Heinsz, Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Discovery, Punitive Damages, Review,
Attorney Fees All Get Tentative OK by NCCUSL Drafting Committee, 5 No. I Disr. RESOL. MAO.
15, 21 (1998) (stating that while no revisions to UAA are final, "changes and additions that have
been made are intended to maintain the arbitral concepts of party autonomy, speed, low cost,
efficiency, finality and fairness").
16. SPIDR, Guidelines For The Design Of Integrated Conflict Management Systems Within
Organizations, at http://www.spidr.org/article/icmsD.html (last visited July 15, 2002); CPR Inst.
for Dispute Resolution, Principles for ADR Provider Organizations, available at http://
www.cpradr.org (last visited July 15, 2002); CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution, Proposed Model
Rule of Professional Conduct for the Lawyer as Third Party Neutral (draft for comment, Apr.
1999), at http://www.cpradr.org/; Comm'n on Ethics and Standards of Dispute Resolution, ADR
Ethics Project, at http://www.cpradr.org/ethics.htm (last visited July 15, 2002); Am. Arbitration
Ass'n, A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of
the Employment Relationship, at http://www.adr.org (last visited July 15, 2002); Am. Arbitration
Ass'n, A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Consumer Disputes, at http://
www.adr.org (last visited July 15, 2002); Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Health Care Claims Settlement
Procedures, at http://www.adr.org (last visited July 15, 2002); see also, Mary Rowe, The Post-
Tailhook Navy Designs an Integrated Dispute Resolution System, 9 NEGOT. J. 207 (1993)
(discussing characteristics and implementation of United States Navy's conflict management
system); Cathy A. Constantino, Using Interest-Based Techniques to Design Conflict Management
Systems, 12 NEGOT. J. 207, 208 (1996) (discussing six principles to use in designing a conflict
management system and arguing for the need to involve all of the stakeholders in the design
process).
SELF-DETERMINATION
step back to take a broader, systematic perspective and to influence the
direction of ADR's evolution. They walk the talk by having broad,
inclusive, consensus-based processes. It is a difficult, time-consuming,
valiant, and valuable effort. In the end, the best case scenario is that a
court will cite the work product as persuasive authority on the question
of the legal limits of the evolving ADR system. 7 However, there is
little hard evidence, few statistics, and limited systematic public policy
research to prove that any of the proposed ways is the right way, or even
an effective way.
There is an issue underlying these efforts, a current of tension in the
discussions, that concerns one of the core values underlying ADR: dis-
putant self-determination. Proponents of alternative or appropriate dis-
pute resolution often argue its chief value is disputant control over the
process. 18 This notion of disputant control or self-determination is dis-
tinct from legal consent. It is not the same concept as voluntary consent
17. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 210 F.3d 771, 773 (7th Cir.
2000) (citing Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for
Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473 (1987)); Bailey v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 209 F.3d
740, 745 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory
Arbitration of Statutory Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293 (2000); Morton H.
Orenstein, Mandatory Arbitration: Alive and Well or Withering on the Vine?, 54 DisP. RESOL. J.
57 (1999)).
18. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques:
A Grid for the Perplexed, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996) (discussing continuums of mediator
roles from facilitative-broad to evaluative-narrow and highlighting the importance of at least some
disputant control over the mediation in three out of the four mediator roles); Neil Vidmar &
Jeffrey Rice, Jury-Determined Settlements and Summary Jury Trials: Observations About
Alternative Dispute Resolution in an Adversary Culture, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 93 (1991).
Although a substantial body of empirical research has found that control is a very
significant factor in determining whether disputants will judge a procedure as fair,
the matter is more complicated. In many conflicts, the disputants perceive the need
to have a third party, rather than themselves, decide the outcome. They recognize
that their interests are diametrically opposed, and an authoritative ruling is needed.
They want to retain control over evidence gathering, presentation, and arguments
about the meaning of the evidence but recognize that someone else, a neutral third
party, needs to decide the final outcome. Thus, procedures that include important
aspects of adversary adjudication or arbitration are often judged more fair and
acceptable than those, such as mediation, that do not . . . . The proponents also
ignore the social and psychological limits of disputants' desire for control over the
resolution process, and they misconceive legal-adversarial approaches to disputes as
incompatible with-indeed, hostile to-ADR.
Id.; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation
Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991); Joel Kurtzberg & Jamie
Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law: Designing an Interest and Rights Focused Model of
Landlord/Tenant Mediation, 1997 J. DisP. RESOL. 53 (1997) (disputing critics of mediation by
noting that because of self-determination in the process, mediation has advantages over traditional
courts because "it encourages the parties to craft creative solutions to their problems"); see also
JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975);
E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
2002]
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for purposes of imputing agreement to an adhesive arbitration clause.I9
Instead, self-determination includes procedural justice notions of a dis-
putant's perceptions of control and fairness. I argue here that dispute
systems vary across two separate dimensions of disputant self-determi-
nation. Those dimensions are disputant self-determination in the design
of the system as a whole, and disputant self-determination within a given
case using a specific dispute resolution process provided by the overall
system design. Self-determination in dispute system design includes
making choices regarding what cases are subject to the process, which
process or processes in sequence are available (mediation, early neutral
evaluation, and binding arbitration, for example), what due process rules
apply, and other structural choices for setting up a private justice system.
Self-determination at the case level includes whether the process results
in a voluntary, negotiated settlement agreement or an imposed binding
third party decision. It includes self-determination as to process and out-
come within a given dispute involving a single set of parties. Most dis-
cussions of self-determination in dispute resolution tend to ignore the
system design level, or assume that self-determination is present, or con-
flate the two levels.
Part I of this article will review the proposed distinction between
self-determination at the case level and self-determination in dispute
system design. The remaining three parts of the article focus on arbitra-
tion of labor and employment disputes. Part II examines what we know
about systems in which both parties have full self-determination over
dispute system design. Part III examines adhesive binding arbitration in
employment disputes, i.e., a dispute system design imposed by one
party. In this part, I present original empirical research on employment
arbitration award patterns before and after implementation of the Due
Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes
Arising out of Employment (the "Due Process Protocol" or the "Proto-
col").2" This research provides evidence of a change in the overall pat-
tern of outcomes after the Protocol, which is intended to regulate
employer-promulgated arbitration plans. Part IV briefly reviews third
party dispute system designs, for example, arbitration programs
designed for the disputants by a court, legislature, or administrative
agency. I conclude that there is evidence that self-determination as to
19. For a discussion of legal consent in arbitration, see Stephen J. Ware, Employment
Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83 (1996) [hereinafter Ware,
Employment Arbitration].
20. See generally JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, THE MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION
OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (1997). The text of the Due Process Protocol is available as an
appendix in this volume, or at the website of the American Arbitration Association, at
www.adr.org.
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dispute system design has an impact on how a dispute resolution system
functions, and that this impact has not been adequately explored by
researchers or considered by courts.
I. SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN A SINGLE CASE CONTRASTED WITH
SELF-DETERMINATION IN DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN
The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators provide in several
sections for party "self-determination. '21 They suggest that mediation is
based on the principle of self-determination, that mediators must have
qualifications necessary to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties, that mediators must conduct the process in a manner consistent with
party self-determination, and that they have a duty to improve the prac-
tice of mediation. 22 These standards do not define self-determination,
nor do they distinguish between self-determination at the case level and
self-determination in system design. I use self-determination at the case
level to refer to a single set of disputing parties in conflict within a given
dispute resolution process, for example, a single mediation case or a
single arbitration case. Self-determination at this level refers to the par-
ties' experience of control over both process and outcome in a single
dispute.
Self-determination in dispute system design refers to control over
the structure of a process or set of processes to handle a series of dis-
putes. There is an established and growing body of literature on dispute
system design that focuses primarily on a dispute resolution program
within an organization, not the courts.2 3 Most of these discussions
21. They provide in relevant part:
I. Self-Determination: A Mediator shall recognize that mediation is based on the
principle of self-determination by the parties. ***
IV. Competence: A Mediator shall mediate only when the mediator has the
necessary qualifications to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the parties. ***
VI. Quality of the Process: A Mediator shall conduct the mediation fairly,
diligently, and in a manner consistent with the principle of self-determination by the
parties. ***
IX. Obligations to the mediation process: Mediators have a duty to improve the
practice of mediation."
Am. Arbitration Ass'n, American Bar Association Dispute Resolution Section & Litigation
Section, & Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators, at http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/dispute/modstan.txt (last visited July 15, 2002).
22. Id.
23. See generally CATHERINE A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY
ORGANIZATIONS (1996); WILLIAM URY ET AL., GETlrING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING
SYSTEMS TO HANDLE CONFLICT (1989); see also Corinne Bendersky, Culture: The Missing Link in
Dispute Systems Design, 14 NEGOT. J. 307 (1998) (advocating a need to tailor dispute systems
with company culture and examine similarities between explicit/policy-driven dispute resolution
and implicit methods of dispute resolution); Costantino, supra note 16, at 62-65 (advocating use
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assume that the sponsoring company, organization, or agency will make
the ultimate choices about the final dispute system design. Since the
leading professional organizations approved Model Ethical Standards at
a time when courts had already implemented mandatory mediation pro-
grams, it is reasonable to conclude that its drafters contemplated self-
determination as to outcome at the individual case level. In mandatory
court-annexed programs, legislatures and courts effectively make dis-
pute system design choices for the parties before the parties use media-
tion for a given case. The legislatures authorized courts to mandate
mediation and the courts are exercising that power.24
A number of leading scholars have helped us develop a better
understanding of what self-determination might mean at the case level.25
These scholars distinguish between self-determination as to process and
of "interest-based" design in which the designer acts to facilitate design by working with all of the
stakeholders). Early work by Ury, Brett, and Goldberg took the collectively bargained grievance
procedure as a model of a dispute system, and experimented with innovations including grievance
mediation, or the use of mediation for labor grievances after they were filed but before they
reached binding arbitration. Jeanne M. Brett & Stephen B. Goldberg, Grievance Mediation in the
Coal Industry: A Field Experiment, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 49 (1983). The literature
discusses issues such as providing multiple points of access to the system, including loop-backs
from impasse to negotiation, arranging steps in a sequence from interest-based to rights-based
processes, and structuring the system to move from low cost to high cost processes. COSTANTINO
& MERCHANT, supra at 59-61. Dispute system designers advocate soliciting input from the
potential users of the process through focus groups and stakeholder participation mechanisms. Id.
at 62-65. There is literature on the value of an ombudsperson's office, and an emerging movement
toward integrated conflict management systems for all the various grievance or dispute resolution
processes available within an organization. See Lisa B. Bingham & Denise R. Chachere, Dispute
Resolution in Employment: The Need for Research, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
WORKER RIGHTS IN THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 104-05 (Adrienn E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe
eds., 1999). See also SPIDR, supra note 16.
24. See generally John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each
Other? 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 844 (1997) (discussing Florida rules and arguing for high
quality consent by parties, including explicit consideration of parties' goals and interests, explicit
identification of plausible options, parties' explicit choice of options for consideration, careful
consideration of options, mediators' restrain in pressuring parties to select particular options,
limitation on use of time pressure, and confirmation of consent, all in light of evolving
"litimediation" culture in which mediators view lawyers, not parties, as clients); see also C.H.
Crowne, The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998: Implementing a New Paradigm of
Justice, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1768 (2001).
25. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Ethics in Environmental ADR: An Overview of Issues and Some
Overarching Questions, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 403 (2000) (advocating intervention by a mediator to
insure greater self-determination by parties in the context of environmental disputes); Robert A.
Baruch Bush, "'What Do We Need a Mediator for?": Mediation's "Value-Added"for Negotiators,
12 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 1, 34 (1996) (arguing "evidence shows clearly that disputants
place great value on the degree and quality of participation" in mediation and that mediators
should place less emphasis on evaluation and more on "empowering" the disputants in the
process); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 93 (2001)
(emphasizing a need to "clarify the meaning of 'self-determination' and to develop effective
mechanisms to protect it," because of the "institutionalization of court-connected mediation").
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as to the outcome of that process. 26 The debate regarding transforma-
tive, facilitative, and evaluative mediation usually addresses this aspect
of the concept of self-determination.2 ' The debate concerns how a
mediator should perform services within a given case. Should the media-
tor attempt to engender empowerment and recognition among the par-
ties?28 Should mediators adopt a variety of techniques based on the level
at which the conflict lives?29 Does the mediator usurp party self-deter-
mination when she gives an opinion regarding the likely outcome of a
case in court?3" Recent commentary regarding the role of counsel in
mediation also tends to focus its analysis on the case level. These discus-
sions concern concepts such as mediation advocacy 3' and the changing
nature of mediation experienced within a given case when courts create
private markets by mandating that parties represented by counsel partici-
pate in the process.32
Relatively little commentary discusses self-determination in the
area of dispute system design. Increasingly, commentators advocate
requiring that counsel inform clients of alternative or appropriate dispute
resolution generally, and the different kinds of processes in particular. 33
26. Welsh, supra note 25, at 7 (containing extensive discussion of self-determination as to the
mediation process and advocating a protection by making the outcome of settlement subject to a
cooling off period).
27. Riskin, supra note 18, at 13 (proposing a grid for understanding mediation practice with
two dimensions of mediator roles from facilitative to evaluative, and scope of mediated issues
from broad to narrow); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation, 11 NEGOT. J. 217
(1995) (reviewing recent literature regarding different methods of mediation); Robert A. Baruch
Bush, A Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Implications, 1994 J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 49
(proposing mediator standards of practice that focus on "categories of ethical dilemmas").
28. See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994).
29. See generally BERNARD MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2000).
30. Baruch Bush, supra note 27, at 22 (noting that a survey of Florida mediators found the
dilemma "reported more often than any other" was preserving self-determination when "tempted
to give the parties a solution" or "tempted to oppose a solution formulated by the parties").
31. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using
Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 269, 274 (1999) (arguing that while lawyers need to modify their method of
advocacy for mediation, adversarial behavior should not be abandoned and lawyers should consult
with clients on division of responsibilities for mediation to overcome "economic and
psychological," or strategic barriers to an appropriate settlement); Peter Robinson, Contending
with Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: A Cautiously Cooperative Approach to Mediation Advocacy, 50
BAYLOR L. REV. 7 963, 965 (1998) (discussing competitive and cooperative techniques for
mediation advocacy, need for "balanced and flexible approach to mediation," and need to make
"conscious strategic decisions" in determining advocacy method).
32. John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 841 (1997) (asserting that the increased use of court-mandated mediation
will increase the number of lawyers who specialize in mediation and increase the amount of
advocacy used in mediation).
33. Plapinger & Stienstra, supra note 7, at 8.
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This provides an opportunity for party self-determination in dispute sys-
tem design, if only the design of a process for a single case. Scholars
advocate fully informed consent by clients; this requires that lawyers
and their clients understand the difference between mediation and arbi-
tration, and the differences among various models of mediation.34 How-
ever, there is often an unstated assumption that the client is represented
by counsel and has a choice in how to design an ADR process for the
case. Many disputants act pro se. The most controversial new systems
give employee or consumer disputants no choices in ADR system design
and may even prohibit representation by counsel.
In parallel to this commentary is the increasingly heated discussion
among arbitration scholars regarding the legitimacy of adhesive arbitra-
tion clauses, or "mandatory arbitration. ' '36 The current state of the law is
that the stronger contracting party may require the weaker contracting
party to participate in arbitration of any disputes arising out of the con-
tract through an adhesive clause, provided that clause meets the stan-
dards for enforcing a contract in that jurisdiction. These standards
include defenses such as duress, unconscionability, fraud, and, to a lim-
ited extent, public policy.37 In this context, if the weaker party proceeds
34. Edwin H. Greenebaum, On Teaching Mediation, 1999 J. Disp. RESOL. 115 (discussing
models of mediation and roles of mediators in context of clinical education in mediation).
35. Mei L. Bickner et a]., Developments in Employment Arbitration: Analysis of a New
Survey of Employment Arbitration Programs, 52-JAN Disp. RESOL. J. 8 (1997).
36. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action,
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Sternlight, Will the
Class Action Survive?]; Colin P. Johnson, Comment, Has Arbitration Become a Wolf in Sheep's
Clothing?: A Comment Exploring the Incompatibility Between Pre-Dispute Mandatory Binding
Arbitration Agreements in Employment Contracts and Statutorily Created Rights, 23 HAMLINE L.
REV. 511 (2000); Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399 (2000); Harry T.
Edwards, Where are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in
Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293 (1999); Beth E. Sullivan, The High Cost of Efficiency:
Mandatory Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 311 (1999); Christine
Stegehuis, Mandatory Arbitration and the Medical Malpractice Plaintiff, 27-MAY COLO. L. 77
(1998); Richard E. Speidel, Symposium on Trial: Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has
Pre-Dispute (Mandatory) Arbitration Outlived its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998); John
P. Roberts, Mandatory Arbitration by Financial Institutions, 50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 365
(1996); Anne Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or
Trap for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 J. CORP. L. 331 (1996); Heidi M. Hellekson, Note, Taking the
"Alternative" Out of the Dispute Resolution of Title VII Claims: The Implications of a Mandatory
Enforcement Scheme of Arbitration Agreements Arising Out of Employment Contracts, 70 N.D. L.
REv. 435 (1994); Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice Through Binding Arbitration of Future
Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or a Trap for the Unwary Consumer?, 5 LoY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 112 (1993).
37. See, e.g., Ware, Employment Arbitration, supra note 19, at 120-28 (arguing that all
standard contract defenses should apply in disputes over voluntary consent to adhesive arbitration
clauses, focusing in particular on duress); Hoffman, supra note 5, at 149 (suggesting that in
addition to duress and unconscionability, a public policy defense can be used in situations "where
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with the economic relationship (employment, health care treatment,
purchase of consumer goods and services), the weaker party is deemed
to have consented to the clause. The entire economic relationship is
presented as a take it or leave it offer; dispute system design is part of
this larger whole. This is consent as a legal concept.38  A variety of
disgruntled would-be litigants would assert forcefully that it is not vol-
untary consent or self-determination as a subjective, psychological con-
cept.39 In this context, it is clear that the weaker party and its counsel
have no control over dispute system design-at least that is the case
after the parties have entered into the economic relationship. The eco-
nomically more powerful party has already made all the design choices
in adopting the arbitration plan. Some scholars argue that arbitration in
these contexts should not be called appropriate or alternative dispute res-
olution at all.4° Professor Fiss's argument against settlement is most
forceful here because the disputants who might be motivated to make
new law or set precedent are contractually disabled from doing so.41
This debate illustrates the tension between self-determination as an
underlying core value of ADR and the notion of legal consent as a his-
torical reality. Distinguishing between self-determination at the case
level and self-determination in system design can foster a more produc-
tive discussion of this tension. Table 1 is an effort to illustrate the differ-
ent dimensions of self-determination in ADR.
Congress or a state legislature has created statutory rights benefiting one party, which arguably
limit the ability to arbitrate disputes relating to those rights").
38. See Ware, Employment Arbitration, supra note 19, at 103-12; Samuel Estreicher,
Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1358
(1997)
(arguing that "arbitration clauses should be invalidated if they fail to satisfy general
principles of contract law, in the absence of other circumstances indicating that the
employee understood what he was waiving. But to go further and insist that these
clauses will be upheld only if they satisfy some vague test for 'voluntariness' is
problematic").
39. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, State High Court Limits Companies' Use of Arbitration, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2000, at A1; Mary Williams Walsh, Court Considers if Employer Can Force
Pledge Not to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2000, at Al; Jenny Strasburg, Workers Fight Lawsuit
Waiver; Justices Will Decide Whether Employers Can Force Mandatory Arbitration on Hires,
S.F. EXAMINER, May 31, 2000, at Cl; Proceeding Under Fire: Consumers, Employees Face Take-
It-Or-Leave-It Contracts, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 30, 2000, at BI; Davan Maharaj, Arbitration
Clauses Upheld in State Court, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1999, at 19; David Segal, Short-Circuiting
the Courts; An Overburdened Legal System Has Turned Mediation into Big Business, WASH.
POST, Oct. 7, 1996, at F12.
40. Jean R. Stemlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument that the Term
"ADR" Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 97.
41. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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TABLE 1. SELF-DETERMINATION AT THE CASE LEVEL AND IN
DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN.
Self-Determination in Individual Case
Self-Determination Parties Control Outcome Third Party Controls
in System Design Outcome
Both/All Parties A. Ad hoc mediation D. Ad hoc arbitration
Ad hoc non-binding Labor arbitration
evaluative processes Negotiated binding
processes
One Party B. Mandatory or E. Adhesive binding
voluntary mediation arbitration
Mandatory or voluntary
non-binding processes
Third Party C. Court-annexed F. Court or administrative
mediation or non-binding adjudication
processes (mandatory or Legislated binding
voluntary) arbitration
Public sector labor
mediation
This table contains six different cells. Cells A, B, and C form the
left hand column and address different levels of self-determination in
dispute system design in mediation and among other non-binding
processes in which parties retain control over, or self-determination as
to, the outcome at the case level. These cells represent arm's length
negotiated use of mediation, adhesive mediation structured by one party,
and court connected mediation and non-binning ADR. I have recently
addressed these in detail elsewhere.42 Cells D, E, and F form the right
hand column of Table 1 and address different levels of self-determina-
tion in various forms of binding arbitration, an ADR process in which
the parties cede control over the outcome to a third party who issues a
binding decision subject to limited judicial review. These cells include
arm's length negotiated use of binding arbitration, adhesive binding
arbitration imposed by a stronger contracting party on a weaker party,
and binding arbitration imposed by an authoritative third party such as
the legislature. The following sections will address in turn each of these
three cells or ategories of self-determination in dispute system designs
using binding arbitration.
42. Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let's Find Out: A Public Policy Research Program on
Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 101.
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II. BOTH DISPUTANTS HAVE FULL SELF-DETERMINATION IN SYSTEM
DESIGN, AND CHOOSE TO CEDE SELF-DETERMINATION OVER
CASE OUTCOME (CELL D)
In Cell D, the parties mutually determine system design; they mutu-
ally agree to cede control over the outcome to an arbitrator. Into this
category falls labor and voluntary arm's length negotiated use of binding
arbitration. This category also includes arbitration by post dispute sub-
mission or pre-dispute ad hoc arbitration when mutually agreed as con-
trasted with imposed. System design self-determination is high because
the parties can negotiate together over key design features. These fea-
tures include, but are not limited to: (1) the types of cases that the parties
wish to submit to binding arbitration; (2) the relevant rules, provider, or
neutrals; (3) discovery; (4) the time frame for decision; (5) the decision
standard; and (6) the form and nature of decision (a naked award or a
reasoned decision). However, self-determination at the case level is low
because once the parties present their evidence to this private judge, the
power to decide the outcome of the process is no longer in their hands.
Short of a timely, voluntary, negotiated settlement and withdrawal of the
case from the process, the arbitrator will dictate the outcome. That
award will be relatively final and difficult to overturn in a court.43
Some might argue that there is self-determination at the case level
because the parties themselves chose a binding process. This conflates
the two dimensions of self-determination. There is social-psychological
literature demonstrating that disputatits report lower satisfaction with
control over the process in binding arbitration than in mediation.44 This
43. Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the
Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 443, 503 (1998) (proposing a new paradigm for commercial arbitration to reduce "tension
between the need for on-the-record decisionmaking and the existing judicial standards" for
vacating an award); Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law
Standard: The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. Disp. Resol. 117, 137
[hereinafter Hayford, "Manifest Disregard"] (advocating associating "manifest disregard" of the
law with FAA section 10(a)(3) as a ground for vacating arbitration awards to help make the
doctrine uniform); Stephen L. Hayford &. Scott B. Kerrigan, Vacatur: The Non-Statutory Grounds
for Judicial Review of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 51-OCT Dlsp. RESOL. J. 22 (1996);
Stephen L. Hayford, Business Law Symposium: Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court
1983-1995: A Sea Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1996); Stephen L. Hayford, Law in
Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731
(1996) [hereinafter Hayford, Law in Disarray]. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT (1994).
44. Debra L. Shapiro & Jeanne M. Brett, Comparing Three Processes Underlying Judgments
of Procedural Justice: A Field Study of Mediation, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1167
(1993). This study of labor grievances indicated disputants "value the opportunity to control the
outcome and to help develop and negotiate that outcome," and therefore favored mediation over
arbitration because of greater feeling of proceduraljustice. Id. at 1176. Also, the study indicated
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finding has subjective reality. There is a meaningful difference between
agreeing to a process, and agreeing to or with the outcome of that pro-
cess. While there may be legal consent to the outcome, this is not the
same as the psychological experience of control.
The traditional labor and commercial arbitration community usu-
ally argues that the parties have bargained for a particular quality of
justice, namely the justice they can get from this arbitrator.4 5 The history
of favorable judicial treatment of binding arbitration refers primarily to
processes in this cell, i.e., binding arbitration in labor relations, and com-
mercial disputes involving disputants of comparable bargaining power
negotiating over the process at arm's length. This is better understood as
approval of a process where there is high self-determination in system
design. In other words, the disputants together have made their bed, so
the courts and legislature will let them lie in it.
There is a substantial body of field and experimental research that
relates to this cell.46 It includes the work done in industrial and labor
relations on binding arbitration of grievances in a collective bargaining
relationship. Most of this work uses a distributive justice framework to
determine who wins what, when. This body of work has certain specific
lessons for dispute system design. It demonstrates that the decision stan-
dard makes a difference in outcome, 47 that a party does better with coun-
sel than without, 48 and that there is tremendous variability in arbitrators'
decisions given the same stipulated facts.49 It makes a difference what
panel an arbitrator comes from because there are systematic ways in
which third party providers construct the panels. 5° For a number of
years, the overall macrojustice result in labor relations has held constant:
"the importance of training third parties to carry out the procedure in a manner that conveys
neutrality, thoughtfulness, and consideration of the views of those who will be affected by the
outcome." Id. But see E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS'
VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATIAON, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 45
(1989) (comparing arbitration with judicial settlement conferences and finding higher satisfaction
with arbitration).
45. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (4th ed. 1991).
46. For reviews of the literature, see Peter Feuille, Dispute Resolution Frontiers in the
Unionized Workplace, in WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 17-55 (1997).
47. Lisa B. Bingham & Debra Mesch, Decision-Making in Employment and Labor
Arbitration, 39 INDUS. REL. 671 (2000) [hereinafter Bingham & Mesch, Decision-Making] (noting
that an experimental study using case hypothetical found a lower rate of reinstatement for Model
Employment Termination Act "good cause" standard than for traditional collective bargaining
"just cause" standard).
48. Richard N. Block & Jack Stieber, The Impact of Attorneys and Arbitrators on Arbitration
Awards, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 543 (1987).
49. Robert J. Thornton & Perry Zirkel, The Consistency and Predictability of Grievance
Arbitration Awards, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 294 (1990).
50. See generally Bingham & Mesch, Decision-Making, supra note 47.
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unions and management each win about half the time.5
In addition, early research on employment arbitration is best under-
stood as falling into this category.52 This author examined distributive
justice by comparing employee and employer win rates and proportion
of damages recovered on their own claims in binding arbitration under
the American Arbitration Association's (AAA) Commercial Rules in
1992.11 The reason that this research fits into this cell is because the
sample of cases arose out of arbitration clauses in individual employ-
ment contracts, generally negotiated at arms' length between employers
and executives or white collar workers. In other words, there was de
facto high self-determination in system design, at least compared to the
newer adhesive arbitration clauses. In these early days of employment
arbitration, there were no special panels or rules beyond the AAA Com-
mercial Rules. Arbitrators generally issued a so-called "naked award,"
providing an answer as to who won, who lost, and who paid the arbitra-
tor.5 4 If cases took only one day to hear, the arbitrator served pro bono.55
Employees won something on their own claims in the great majority of
these cases.56 Whether or not the arbitrator earned a fee on the case did
not affect employer success. Both parties had lower rates of recovery
when the case resulted in an arbitrator fee, probably because these were
more complex, more hotly contested cases. This pattern of results tended
to contradict assertions of systemic bias in favor of employers in
employment arbitration. This pattern makes sense in that the sample
addressed cases in which there was high self-determination in system
design because the disputants, who were generally represented by coun-
sel, agreed to use arbitration as the result of an arm's length negotiation.
III. ONE PARTY SELF-DETERMINATION IN SYSTEM DESIGN AND
THIRD PARTY CONTROL OVER OUTCOME AT THE CASE
LEVEL: ADHESIVE BINDING ARBITRATION
(CELL E)
Cell E involves cases where one party has effective self-determina-
5 1. See generally Peter Feuille, Dispute Resolution Frontiers in the Unionized Workplace, in
WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 35 (Sandra E.
Gleason ed., 1997) (citing statistics from American Arbitration Association).
52. See Table 2, infra p. 620.
53. Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Disputes?: An
Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 369 (1995) [hereinafter
Bingham, Bias in Arbitration].
54. Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 529-38 (1997).
55. Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 223, 233 (1998) [hereinafter
Bingham, Statistics in Judicial Review].
56. Bingham, Bias in Arbitration, supra note 53, at 378.
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tion in the design of the dispute resolution system and uses it to give
control over outcome at the case level to an arbitrator: adhesive, binding
arbitration. In this cell, one of the disputants has the economic power to
impose binding arbitration on the other disputant under a plan it has
structured unilaterally. The great bulk of critical commentary on ADR
addresses this cell." The core of the problem is that these designs
impose a binding process on a party who does not want to participate,
preferring, rather, a "day in court" in the civil justice system. The bind-
ing arbitration process deprives the party of self-determination as to the
outcome of the case. The party's role in designing the system may be so
limited that it is not permitted any choice in selecting the neutral, and in
some instances, may be denied the right to have counsel present during
the process.58 It is the combination of low self-determination as to out-
come and system design that makes these processes so troubling for
many commentators. Professor Reuben would modify the limited scope
of review in binding arbitration in certain circumstances to ensure due
process consistent with constitutional minima in recognition of the state
action inherent in enforcing contracts that send parties into private jus-
57. Sternlight, Will the Class Action Survive?, supra note 36, at 53-63 (discussing imposition
of mandatory pre-dispute binding arbitration); Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?, supra note
5, at 674-97; Cole, supra note 5, at 452 (asserting a need to change rules governing adhesive
arbitration clauses in employment contracts because of the advantage employers have as repeat
players); Stone, Yellow Dog Contract, supra note 5, at 1050 (arguing that expanded use of
adhesive arbitration clauses in employment contracts subjects "employment rights to a regime of
private justice and cowboy arbitrations," and that Congress should outlaw employers' use of
arbitration as a condition of employment); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come out
Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
19, 33, 43, 46-48 (1999) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Repeat Players in ADR]. Mandatory
arbitration "clauses often eliminate choices with respect to decisionmaker, rules of evidence, and
procedure or substantive law." Id. at 33. "Employees, labor lawyers, and civil rights activists have
been most distrustful of an 'employer-controlled' dispute resolution system that is thought to lack
many procedural due process protections and which may be controlled by decisionmakers who do
not understand the legal entitlements at issue." Id. at 43. "For some, the issues of fairness and
advantage can be dealt with by program or system design." Id. at 46.
The idea is that macro justice concerns can be met and indeed enhanced with use of
ADR where ADR can increase access and reduce cost and time for employee
grievances, as well as provide for more tailor-made solutions, at least in some cases.
Indeed, although there are those who argue that the main advantage for repeat
players is the ability to manipulate rules, fora, and decisionmakers, some are
concerned that if alternative justice systems are perceived as efficient and receptive
to good solutions, they may actually increase the amount of claiming.
Id. at 47-48.
58. Bickner et al., supra note 35, at 11 (suggesting that an employee required to arbitrate
because of an adhesive contract may be at a disadvantage because "an arbitrator's neutrality might
be compromised since only one party is in a position to select, or reject, the arbitrator for future
cases," and the employee may not always be permitted independent representation).
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tice systems.59 His argument is an effort to impose third party control
over dispute system design through the courts.
For the foreseeable future, these systems are generally legal and
enforceable. The United States Supreme Court upheld this use of arbitra-
tion in Circuit City Stores v. Adams,60 a case in which an employee
challenged the enforceability of a mandatory or compulsory arbitration
plan under federal anti-discrimination laws. The disputants' briefs make
public policy arguments for and against compulsory arbitration based on
the fairness of the process. The Court, however, limited its discussion to
the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the act's exception
for "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. ' 61
The question was whether this language excluded most employment
contracts from coverage under the FAA. The Court held it did not and
swept within the FAA's coverage most arbitration plans involving
employment relationships. The Court's decision will only accelerate the
growth of binding arbitration plans among large institutional players and
remove the final obstacle to complete federal preemption of the field.
61
With state legislatures effectively disabled from regulating arbitration,
63
and Congress politically unwilling to do so, there is a regulatory gap in
this developing area of public policy. 6 Only the judicial branch, within
the limits of the substantial finality accorded arbitration awards, likely
will control evolving programs.
This is the area within which much of the effort toward self-regula-
tion of ADR is aimed.65 This self-regulation can best be understood as
an effort to compensate for the control or self-determination that large
59. Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000).
60. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
61. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Later, the Court permitted adhesive
compulsory arbitration of age discrimination complaints. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (enforcing a compulsory arbitration clause contained in a U-4 securities
registration form and compelling binding arbitration of an employee's claim of discrimination
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
62. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT. REV.
331.
63. Doctors' Assocs., Inc. v. Cassarato, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
64. Federal agencies are trying to fill the gap with policy statements, for example, that of the
EEOC, see Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the EEOC, 27 PEPP. L.
REV. 1 (1999), and the NLRB, see Yatsco, Comment, supra note 11, at 291 (suggesting that the
NLRB should reverse its position and support the enforcement of mandatory arbitration
agreements).
65. Stephen Hayford and Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An
Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 343 (1995) (calling for
organizations and persons with a stake in arbitration to engage in a public dialogue to shape the
form and character of the process and the neutrals).
2002]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
institutional players are exercising over system design. For example, the
Due Process Protocol attempts to guarantee employees minimal due pro-
cess, such as the right to counsel, discovery, information about arbitra-
tors' records, a role in selecting the arbitrator, allocation of arbitration
fees, and a reasoned award.66 Similarly, Protocols for Health Care and
Consumer Dispute Resolution attempt to provide standards for system
design through self-regulation. Recently proposed model ethical stan-
dards for third party providers of dispute resolution services also encom-
pass programs in this cell.67 These efforts are implemented through the
voluntary choice of major third party providers, such as the AAA, to
enforce them. None of the protocols, however, has the force of law;
they impose no real limit on an institutional player that decides to opt
out and set up its own panel or contractual relationship with a non-com-
pliant third party provider.
There is some limited empirical research on this category of
processes. This author has conducted a program of research on the
macrojustice of employment arbitration awards using a distributive jus-
tice analysis that focuses on win/loss rates and proportion of demand
recovered in money damages, as well as reinstatement to employment,
as a remedy. A summary of this stream of research appears below in
Table 2. This summary reports results in terms of the percentage of all
arbitration claims that employees file against employers in which they
win something (whether that relief is monetary or non-monetary).
66. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of
Statutory Disputes Arising out of the Employment Relationship, at http://www.adr.org/rules/
employment/protocol.html (last visited July 15, 2002) ("Employees considering the use of ...
arbitration procedures should have the right to be represented .... Adequate but limited pre-trial
discovery is to be encouraged and employees should have access to all information reasonably
relevant."). For a detailed analysis, see generally JOHN DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION
AND ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (1997).
67. CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution, Principles for ADR Provider Organizations, supra note
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF PRIOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON REPEAT
PLAYER EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
Study Award Year AAA Rules Total Case Sample Employee
Win Rate on
Their Own
Claims
Bingham68  1992 Commercial 171 74%
Bingham69  1993 Commercial 186 71%
Employment 28 40%
Bingham70  1993-94 Commercial 186
Employment 84
Repeat Player 16%
Employer
Non-repeat Player 71%
Employer
Bingham 7 l 1993-95 Employment 203
Dispute
Resolution
Repeat Player 23%
Employer
Non-repeat Player 67%
Employer
An early study found differences in the pattern of outcomes
between cases arising under the AAA Commercial Rules and the AAA
Employment Rules in 1993. The Employment Rules cases included
repeat employers using adhesive arbitration clauses in personnel manu-
als; employees had lower success rates in these cases.72 Two subsequent
studies using Professor Galanter's conception of repeat players and one-
shotters in the civil justice system 73 found evidence that employers that
repeatedly use employment arbitration do better in the process than one-
time users. 4 When one examines this phenomenon more closely, one
68. Lisa B. Bingham, Bias in Arbitration, supra note 53, at 378.
69. Lisa B. Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration: A Look at
Actual Cases, 47 LAB. L.J. 108, 114 (1996) [hereinafter Bingham, Emerging Due Process].
70. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, I EMPLOYEE RTS.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997) [hereinafter Bingham, Repeat Player Effect].
71. Bingham, Statistics in Judicial Review, supra note 55, at 223 (1998).
72. Bingham, Emerging Due Process, supra note 69, at 116.
73. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974); see also Menkel-Meadow, Repeat Players in ADR, supra
note 57, at 19.
74. Bingham, Statistics in Judicial Review, supra note 55, at 238; Bingham, Repeat Player
Effect, supra note 70, at 210. It is important to note that the method used in these studies did not
follow a conception of repeat player in a strict, game theoretic sense. Limitations in sample size
and available data precluded the more desirable analysis, which would follow the relationship
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finds that employers do better than employees when arbitration is pursu-
ant to an adhesive personnel manual arbitration clause. This is an exam-
ple of a case where the employee has no control over system design
once he or she consents to the employment relationship.
Professor Galanter's catalogue of repeat player advantages gener-
ally translates into control over dispute system design. For example,
repeat players: (1) have more experience; (2) use that experience to
change how they will structure the next similar transaction; (3) have
expertise, economies of scale, and access to specialist advocates; (4)
have informal continuing relationships with institutional incumbents; (5)
reputation and credibility in bargaining; (6) can use long-term risk tak-
ing strategies; (7) can influence rules through lobbying; (8) can play for
precedent and favorable future rules; and (9) can invest resources in
getting favorable rules implemented. 75 This conception of repeat play-
ers is broader than the game theoretic use of the term.
It is important to note that these studies do not compare employ-
ment arbitration to the civil justice system. They look only at sub-sam-
ples of employment arbitration cases compared to each other, for
example, personnel manual cases compared to others, employee claims
compared to employer claims, and one-time employer users compared to
repeat employer users. Others have attempted to compare arbitrated and
litigated outcomes.7 6 These comparisons must be understood in the con-
text of the selection bias inherent in the samples studied. It is unclear
whether the samples of litigated and arbitrated cases are comparable.77
These samples may be drawn from populations of cases that settle at
different rates, have legal counsel at different rates, involve differing
decision standards (statutory compared to contractual), and myriad other
relevant and uncontrolled variables. The author's own arbitration
between individual employers and the specific arbitrators used repeatedly over time. Instead, the
studies defined repeat player simply as an employer that appeared in the sample more than once.
There were no repeat employees in the samples. This conception of the variable has been
criticized. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 4, at 144. However, a later study of the repeat player
variable found an effect whether cases were coded as repeat player cases for all the appearances of
a given employer in the sample, or only for the second and subsequent appearances. See Elizabeth
Hill, Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association: An
Empirical Study, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53D ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, KLUWER
LEGAL INT'L (Samuel Estreicher ed., forthcoming 2002).
75. Galanter, supra note 73, at 97-103.
76. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What Really
Does Happen? What Really Should Happen? 50-OCT.-Nov. DisP. RESOL. J. 40 (1995); Lewis
Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
29 (1998) (reporting higher adjusted outcome or percentage of demand recovered for arbitration
cases than litigation cases although there are lower cash awards in arbitration).
77. Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to the Study of
Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 735 (2001).
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research does not attempt this kind of comparison; instead, it compares
sub-samples of arbitration cases using various criteria such as repeat use
of arbitration by the employer in the sample or arbitration based on an
adhesive personnel manual clause compared to an individual employ-
ment contract.
Self-regulation through the Due Process Protocol imposed certain
minimum standards for dispute system design, including a right to coun-
sel, information and references for arbitrators on a given selection list,
participation in selection of the arbitrator for the specific case (though
not selection of the third party administrator), allocation of forum and
arbitrator fees and costs, discovery, and written, reasoned decision. The
AAA enforced these protections systematically in the post-Protocol
cases in the sample.78 A study of cases decided after adoption of the Due
Process Protocol found that employer success declined compared to pre-
Protocol case outcomes in arbitration cases using an adhesive personnel
manual arbitration clause.79 These protections appear to have influenced
the overall pattern of outcomes. This effect can best be understood in
light of the limits that the Protocol places on employer self-determina-
tion in dispute system design. The AAA systematically screened out
employer plans that failed to provide the minimum due process required
by the Protocol.80 This interfered with employer control over the dispute
resolution system.
The following tables report descriptive characteristics of two sam-
ples of cases decided before and after the Protocol.8 The samples
78. Author's personal conversation with Robert Meade, AAA, Sept. 1998.
79. Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due
Process Protocolfor Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of Employment:
Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53D
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, KLUWER LEGAL INT'L (Samuel Estreicher ed., forthcoming
2002). This study uses a multivariate logistic regression with a dichotomous variable employer
success and independent variables including repeat player, personnel manual, Due Process
Protocol, together with interaction terms for personnel handbook and Protocol, and repeat player
and personnel handbook. Id. It finds that the interaction between personnel handbook and Protocol
is marginally statistically significant, and is associated with decreased employer success. Id.
80. Personal Conservation with Robert Meade, AAA.
81. These analyses were previously presented as conference papers but never previously
published in journal article form. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration after the Due
Process Protocol: Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, Paper
Presented at the 1998 Conference of the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution in
Portland, Or. (Oct. 15, 1998) (copy of paper available from author). Lisa B. Bingham,
Employment Arbitration After the Due Process Protocol: Preliminary Evidence that Self-
Regulation Makes a Difference, Colloquium presented at the Arbitration in the 21st Century
Conference in New York, New York (Sept. 24, 1998) (copy of paper available from author); Lisa
B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration after the Due Process Protocol. Where Do We Go from
Here?, as part of panel entitled, Under My Thumb: Worker Rights in the Changing Workplace, at
the 1999 Conference of the Law and Society Association in Chicago, Ill. (May 28, 1999) (copy of
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include AAA Employment Rules cases decided between 1993 and 1995,
and an additional sample of AAA Employment Rules cases decided after
implementation of the Protocol in 1996-1997. The AAA identified the
cases in the samples. They represented all the cases for which the AAA
had on file arbitration awards during the 1993-1995 time period, and the
first fifty-nine cases for which it had on file arbitration awards after the
Protocol. Researchers used information from three document sources for
each case: (1) the original demand for arbitration; (2) the final arbitra-
tion award; and (3) the AAA's own computer report closing the case. A
case was included in analysis if the requisite information appeared any-
where in the three sources. If, however, key information was missing,
that case was omitted from that particular analysis. For example, the
mean and median demand amounts were calculated using only those
cases for which demand information was available.8 2 The case files rep-
resented information for the majority of all arbitrations that concluded
with an award during the time period 1993-1995. Table 3 reports means
and medians of various characteristics in the cases, including the
demand amount, the damages awarded, the percentage recovered (also
known as "outcome," a ratio of damages divided by demand), arbitrator
fees, employee and employer shares of fees, and AAA fees.
It is important to note that analyses of variance revealed no signifi-
cant differences pre- and post-Protocol. In other words, the two samples
are statistically similar in a number of key respects. In addition, the
subject matter addressed in the cases was comparable. Table 4 reflects
paper available from author); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration After the Due Process
Protocol: Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, Colloquium Presented
at Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations in Ithaca, N.Y. (Mar. 30, 1999)
(copy of paper available from author); Lisa B. Bingham, If the Repeat Player Effect is Sophistry,
Why Did the Protocol Make A Difference?, address as part of a luncheon plenary panel entitled,
Repeat Player Effect: Syndrome or Sophistry?, at the Second National Employment ADR Enclave
of the American Arbitration Association in San Francisco, Cal. (Nov. 4, 1999) (transcript
available from author).
82. The results reported in this paper are from a sample of 265 cases that were decided
exclusively under the AAA Employment Dispute Resolution Rules during the period from
January I, 1993 through June, 1997. During that period, the cases were not subject to the Due
Process Protocol. Sub-samples of 206 cases were from 1993-1995 and were the subject of
previous studies (Bingham 1996, 1997, 1998). The remaining fifty-nine cases decided during the
period June 1, 1996 to June 1, 1997 were subject to the Due Process Protocol. The total sample
represents all the cases that the AAA could locate in its national files that involved an employment
arbitration and were decided during the relevant time periods. While this is not the entire
population of cases decided during this time period, it is the great majority of them, and the
sample appears to be random. The AAA itself identified the cases for analysis, and while cases
did not always contain complete information, they were used for every analysis in which the
necessary information was provided by one of the three documents. There was no bias imposed
by the selection of the researcher nor has any representative of the AAA ever suggested that the
samples were unrepresentative of the awards during that time period.
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TABLE 3. SELECTED COST CHARACTERISTICS
Pre-Protocol
(N=162-206)
Mean Median
Demand $184,395 $19,350
Damages Awarded $52,737 $0
Percentage Recovered 25% 0
Arbitrator Fees $3,121 $1,171
Employer Share of Fee $2,824 $800
Employee Share of Fee $834 0
AAA Fees $2,506 $937
OF SAMPLES OVERALL
Post-Protocol
(N=28-59)
Mean Median
$236,073 $46,000
$39,279 $0
25% 0
$3,533 $2,347
$2,707 $1,825
$961 0
$1,717 $1,250
that the cases were similarly distributed across the range of typical
employment disputes in arbitration.
TABLE 4. FREQUENCY OF LEGAL CLAIMS BY EMPLOYEES
Pre-Protocol' Post-Protocol2
Breach of Express Contract 59% 50%
Breach of Implied Contract 35% 19%
Wrongful Discharge Tort 7% 3%
Wrongful Dismissal Based on Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 2% 0%
Race Discrimination 6% 7%
Sex Discrimination 5% 2%
Age Discrimination 2% 9%
Disability Discrimination 4% 5%
Invasion of Privacy 0.5% 0%
Defamation 3% 3%
Other Claims 10% 21%
' (N=187)
2 (N=58)
[Percentages do not add to 100% because each case could raise multiple legal
claims or separate causes of action.]
There were some interesting similarities in respect to other case
factors, as reflected in Table 5. These factors include the percentage of
employer claims, multiple arbitrator panels, repeat player employers,
repeat arbitrators, and frequency with which damages or reinstatement
was awarded.
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TABLE 5. FREQUENCY OF VARIOUS DESCRIPTIVE CASE FACTORS
Pre-Protocol' Post-Protocol2
Employer Claims 9% 12%
Multiple Arbitrator Panels 10% 10%
Repeat Player Employers 35% 29%
Arbitrators Used Repeatedly 10% 7%
by a Single Employer
Damages Awarded 44% 53%
(regardless of amount)
Reinstatement Awarded 7% 5%
(N=205-206)
(N=59)
Statistically, there were significantly fewer personnel handbook
arbitration clauses in the post-Protocol sample (35% pre- compared to
19% post-),8 3 and statistically significantly more women arbitrators
(24% pre- compared to 49% post-).8 4 There appeared to be more highly
compensated claimants in the post-Protocol sample, but limited informa-
tion in the case files made coding this variable problematic.
Despite the great similarity between the two samples on these vari-
ous descriptive dimensions, there were several important differences.
Due to the small size of the post-Protocol sample, these can only be
characterized as preliminary findings and trends. Table 7 reflects per-
centages of cases in which employees recovered some kind of relief on
their own claims using a variety of different categorical variables. For
example, there were roughly equivalent employee win rates with repeat
player employers before and after the Protocol, 27% before and 29%
after. The repeat player variable, coded as present whenever an
employer appears more than once in the sample, continues to be statisti-
cally significant in a multivariate analysis. 85 In other words, employers
win more frequently when they are repeat players in the sample.
This result has recently been replicated independently with a larger
sample of post-Protocol cases. 86 The research showed that the repeat
player effect existed whether repeat player cases were coded to include
all the cases involving an employer who appeared more than once in the
sample, or only those cases involving the second appearance of the
83. Pearson chi square = 5.265, p<.02.
84. Pearson chi square = 14.208, p<0001.
85. Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 79.
86. Hill, supra note 74.
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TABLE 6. FREQUENCY OF RELIEF OF ANY KIND AWARDED TO
EMPLOYEES ON THEIR OWN CLAIMS.
Pre-Protocol' Post-Protocol2
Repeat Player Employer 27% 29%
Not Repeat Player Employer 70% 51%
Repeat Arbitrator 25% 50%
Not Repeat Arbitrator 58% 44%
Personnel Handbook Arbitration Clause 25% 40%
Other than Personnel Handbook 72% 46%
(n=187)
2 (n=52)
employer in the sample (i.e., the first actual repeat appearance).87 The
researcher posits, however, that the underlying case of the repeat player
pattern is actually an "appellate effect," one caused by employer screen-
ing and settlement of meritorious claims at lower in-house steps of an
employment dispute resolution program administered by a large
employer with sophisticated human resource management practices. She
finds that the repeat player variable and appellate effect variable are
highly correlated.
The appellate theory is an interesting one. There is data in Table 7,
however, that suggests that more is at work in employment arbitration
outcomes than simply large, more sophisticated employers settling meri-
torious cases against them in good faith. There is an interesting differ-
ence in employee win rates in cases involving arbitration pursuant to a
unilateral employer-promulgated personnel handbook arbitration clause
before and after the Protocol. Before the Protocol, the employees' win
rate on their own claims was 25%; afterward, it increased to 40%. The
difference can be illustrated in part by Figure 1.
Figure 1 illustrates the difference using employees' win rates on
their own claims. An analogous difference in the gap between win rates
on personnel handbook clauses and other contractual arbitration clauses
before and after the Protocol was found to be marginally statistically
significant in a multivariate analysis that used employer success as the
dependent variable and a sample that included both employer and
employee claims.88 If the repeat player effect were simply an appellate
effect, one would not expect to see any change. An alternative explana-
tion may be that the AAA itself screened personnel handbook plans after
the Protocol to ensure that they contained all the due process protections
87. Hill, supra note 74 (manuscript on file with author).
88. Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 79.
2002]
900 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI L_4W REVIEW [Vol. 56:873
FIGURE 1. BEFORE AND AFTER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL: EMPLOYEE
WIN RATES WITH PERSONNEL HANDBOOK AND OTHER
CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION CLAUSES
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that the Protocol required. It is possible that these additional procedural
protections, including the right to counsel, reasonable discovery, partici-
pation in selection of the arbitrator, and information about the arbitrator
to inform that selection, all contributed to leveling the playing field in
employer-promulgated plans.
Another theory related to the appellate effect is that the cases that
make it to employment arbitration are weak on the merits.89 This is a
difficult theory to test empirically. One researcher attempted to do so by
a review of arbitration awards on their face.90 She concluded that the
employees' claims were weak and that the awards against them were
justified by the merits.9 ' Unfortunately, ample research has identified
wide variation in outcomes of hypothetical arbitration cases; when a
sample fact pattern is given to a set of arbitrators, they do not uniformly
decide the case the same way, even though they are using the same deci-
sional standard. 92 Moreover, it is difficult from the face of an award to
know all the facts relevant to the case. Absent the information available
in reasonably complete discovery, the outcome is difficult to evaluate.
Arbitrators can only decide cases based on the information presented to
89. Hill, supra note 74.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See generally Bingham & Mesch, Decision-Making, supra note 47, at 671-94 (finding
that commercial arbitrators ruled in favor of employees less frequently than labor arbitrators under
both just cause and statutory dismissal standards), and studies cited therein.
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them. An outside evaluator can only judge the merits based on the facts
the arbitrator chose to include in the award.
In one leading and highly regarded study of New Jersey's court-
annexed non-binding arbitration programs for tort cases involving auto-
mobile negligence claims, researchers found that more than half of all
the litigants who had gone through an arbitration requested a de novo
trial on their cases; surprisingly, arbitration and trial verdicts were in
agreement only sixty-eight percent of the time in these de novo trials.93
In thirty-two percent of the cases, the outcome was different at trial. 94
This was true notwithstanding the use of court selected arbitrators as
subject matter experts with legal training, substantial experience, and
ADR training. In short, it is difficult to draw absolute conclusions about
the merits of arbitration awards from a facial reading; one can only act
like an experienced trial lawyer and report one's best guess of the odds.
In a perfect world, researchers could take a large random sample of
all employment disputes and randomly assign them to the public justice
system or binding arbitration. We would then compare the outcomes as
to rate of settlement before adjudication, outcomes in settlements and
adjudicated awards, outcomes in arbitration and court, and efficiencies
of the processes. In research, however, the world is usually imperfect,
and in field research, it goes so far as to be deeply flawed. Getting all the
relevant players' informed consent to such a study is likely to be impos-
sible. That said, policy makers need this information, and researchers
should endeavor to get as close to this perfect data as possible.
The severest critics of mandatory arbitration have no problem at all
with mediation, including mandatory mediation.9 Their concern with
93. ROBERT J. MACCOUN ET AL., ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW
JERSEY AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM 26-27 (1988).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 39, at A l (quoting Cliff Palefsky as saying, "Remember how
we used to mock the Soviet Union for having a civil justice system that was private?"); Strasburg,
supra note 39, at Cl (quoting Cliff Palefsky as saying before the Cal. Sup. Ct., "Agreeing to
arbitration 'as a condition of getting a job or putting food on the table' undermines the value
arbitration can have when the system is used fairly.... The only way to make arbitration fair is to
make it voluntary"); Proceeding Under Fire, supra note 39, at BI (quoting Cliff Palefsky as
saying,
The most significant shortcomings are the fact that the arbitrators do not need to
know or follow the law; it can be enormously expensive; discovery is very limited,
which can be fatal in certain cases; there is no appeal; it may be difficult to obtain
the testimony of out-of-state witnesses; and arbitrators rarely award meaningful
punitive damages or emotional distress damages and all too frequently fail to award
attorneys' fees to prevailing parties, even though the law requires it.[)];
Segal, supra note 39, at F12 (quoting Cliff Palefsky as saying,
Laws are supposed to be an expression of the public will, so allowing corporations
to opt out of the laws completely undermines the purpose of legislation.... When
it's voluntary mediation, we think that ADR is great. But people need to understand
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adhesive arbitration stems from one party's complete control over dis-
pute system design.96 The importance of the repeat player effect is only
that it forces careful examination of the processes that employers are
constructing unilaterally to resolve employment conflict out of court.
The differences before and after the Protocol suggest that control over
dispute system design is relevant. There does not yet exist sufficient data
upon which to conclude what is causing the repeat player effect; there
are many possibilities. Disputant self-determination as to dispute system
design is certainly one that warrants continuing investigation.
IV. THIRD PARTY SELF-DETERMINATION AS TO DISPUTE SYSTEM
DESIGN AND THIRD PARTY CONTROL OVER OUTCOME AT
THE CASE LEVEL: COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE
ARBITRATION (CELL F)
There are circumstances in which neither disputant designs a dis-
pute resolution system; instead, a court, administrative agency, or legis-
lative body does it for them. For example, a significant number of state
and federal courts provide mandatory or voluntary non-binding arbitra-
tion.91 Many states provide non-binding and binding interest arbitration
as a dispute settlement mechanism for public employee labor disputes.98
States have also adopted arbitration to resolve disputes over allegedly
defective automobiles, as in the so-called "Lemon Law" statutes.99 Con-
gress passed the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act of 1978
that the goal of mandatory arbitration is finality, not justice or doing the right
thing[)].
96. For a recent example of a study severely critical of adhesive arbitration plans and the
forum costs they impose on would-be litigants, see Public Citizen Congress Watch, The Costs of
Arbitration (May 1, 2002) (reporting case studies of individual disputes forced into arbitration
through adhesive clauses, including examples of cases in which the plaintiffs abandoned their
claims due to an inability to pay for forum costs, including filing fees, processing fees, costs for
discovery, hearing room fees, and arbitrator fees). Other studies of arbitration costs have found
them to be relatively low on average. See infra Table 3; Hill, supra note 74.
97. The Harvard Law Review Ass'n, supra note 4, at 1858 (observing that as of 1999, there
was court-annexed arbitration in thirty-three states and twenty-two federal district courts) (citing
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER
PROCESSES 234 (3d ed. 1999)).
98. For a discussion of various state public employee arbitration statutes, see, for example,
Rebecca Hanner White et al., Ohio's Public Employee Bargaining Law: Can it Withstand
Constitutional Challenge?, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Robert Perkovich & Mark H. Stein,
Challenges to Arbitration Under Illinois Public Sector Labor Relations Statutes, 7 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 191 (1989); Dennis R. Nolan, Federal Sector Labor Arbitration: Differences,
Problems, Cures, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 805 (1987); Robert P. Hebdon & Robert N. Stem, Tradeoffs
Among Expressions of Industrial Conflict: Public Sector Strike Bans and Grievance Arbitrations,
51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 204 (1998); Stuart S. Mukamal, Unilateral Employer Action Under
Public Sector Binding Interest Arbitration, 6 J.L. & COM. 107 (1986); Robert G. Howlett, Interest
Arbitration in the Public Sector, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 815 (1984).
99. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 681.109 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-787 (2001); ME. REV
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to provide binding arbitration as the dispute settlement mechanism for
Olympic athletes and their governing boards. 1" Arbitration is built into
certain environmental laws.10' These are but a few representative
examples.
In cases where a third party exercises self-determination over dis-
pute system design, the resulting program takes a form that is different
from adhesive programs. This part of the article is intended only to illus-
trate a few of these differences, not to constitute a comprehensive review
of such programs. Even a cursory review suggests that self-determina-
tion over dispute system design is an important dimension for future
research on arbitration. For example, studies of court-annexed programs
have found that in designing programs for the disputants, courts are
careful to solicit input from the bench, bar associations, and balanced
committees of the plaintiffs' and defendants' bar.'°2 In adhesive arbitra-
tion programs, an enlightened employer might convene a focus group to
inform dispute system design, but usually the system is constructed in
consultation with the employer's counsel and designed unilaterally.
Court-annexed programs provide for the same basic protections as
the Due Process Protocol. For example, it is axiomatic that parties may
choose to be represented by counsel.0 3 While this would appear to be a
basic requisite of a fair process, it is one that private sector employers
omitted from early arbitration dispute system designs and one that they
are still reluctant to extend to in-house dispute resolution procedures.'"
STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1169 (2001); N.M. STAT ANN. § 57-24-4 (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 50-503
(2001).
100. 36 U.S.C.A. §§ 220501-220511 (2002).
101. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9615 (1998), specifically 42 U.S.C. § 9612(b), providing for arbitration by a
board of arbitrators established by the President and selected through the procedures of the
American Arbitration Association.
102. See, e.g., MACCOUN ET AL., supra note 93, at 1-2 (noting that variation in court-annexed
arbitration program designs stem from legislative decisions informed by advice from the state
judicial councils, court administrative offices, bar, and other interested organizations, as well as
advice from key constituencies such as lawyers, insurance companies, public advocates, and
individual litigants); BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT
COURTS 31 (1990) (noting that all of the pilot courts consulted with the bar and in some cases,
courts worked with bar association committees to craft the arbitration rule).
103. Barbara S. Meierhoefer, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS 65-93
(1990) (reporting attorney views of arbitration programs). But note that the right to retain counsel
is not the same as the economic ability to afford counsel. See Deborah L. Rhode, Too Much Law,
Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, II GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989 (1998)
(arguing that there are not too many lawyers, but rather too many lawyers competing for the
highest paying clients, and that the working class litigant is underserved).
104. Bickner et al., supra note 35, at 8; Alan J.S. Colvin, The Relationship Between
Employment Arbitration and Workplace Dispute Resolution Procedures, 16 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP.
RESOL. 643, 658 (2001) (observing that a major due process deficiency in many workplace
procedures is the lack of provision for representation of employees in presenting complaints, and
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In contrast, federal agency employers are barred from unilaterally man-
dating employment arbitration under the terms of the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1996;105 federal agencies allow free choice
of representatives as a regular feature of employment mediation
programs. '0 6
Another key design feature is the identity of the arbitration panel.
Employers designing programs unilaterally may designate a major pro-
vider that has adopted the provisions of the Due Process Protocol; for
example, the AAA,10 7 National Arbitration Forum (NAF),' 0 or Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS). 1 9 These providers publi-
cize their panels of arbitrators and how the panels were constructed. For
example, the AAA used local committees of the plaintiffs and defend-
ants bar to select the initial Employment Arbitrator Roster. 1o Neverthe-
less, other employers acting unilaterally may choose to designate a
small, captive provider, or to create their own supposed panel."'I This
control over the people on the panel makes a difference. A controlled
experimental study on arbitrator decision-making compared commercial
arbitrators, labor arbitrators, National Academy labor arbitrators, and
students, and found systematic differences in the way these groups
decided a hypothetical employee dismissal case." 2
In contrast, courts establish panels of arbitrators using a process
that is wholly transparent. For example, most federal courts have estab-
lished their own rosters of neutrals, and take responsibility for assuring
their quality through local rules that set eligibility criteria.' ' Qualifica-
that employers continue to be reluctant to permit representation from outside the company for in-
house dispute resolution steps, even if the procedure permits mediation or arbitration).
105. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (2002).
106. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham et al., Exploring the Role of Representation in Employment
Mediation at the USPS, 17 OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 341 (2002) (reporting on mediation
duration, settlement rates, perceptions of fairness, and participant satisfaction with participation of
employees and supervisors with different kinds of representation, including lawyers, union or
professional association representatives, co-workers, friends, or no representative). There is a
substantial argument for a right to union representation in employment dispute resolution during
in-house and out-of-house dispute resolution steps. See Matthew W. Finkin, Bridging The
Representation Act, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391 (2001).
107. For policy statements on the Protocol, see the AAA website at http://www.adr.org.
108. The NAF policy statements can be found at http://www.arb-forum.com.
109. The JAMS policy statement appears at http://www.jamsadr.com.
110. Author's personal communications with representatives of the AAA.
I 11. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that
supposed panel of arbitrators was not impartial or independent and hence not arbitrators).
112. Bingham & Mesch, Decision-Making, supra note 47, at 671-94 (finding that commercial
arbitrators ruled in favor of employees less frequently than labor arbitrators under both just cause
and statutory dismissal standards).
113. ROBERT J. NIEMIC ET AL., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR 67-69
(2001).
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tions include ADR training, legal training and subject matter expertise,
reputation in the local legal community, and minimum length of profes-
sional service." 4 In addition, there are rules of professional conduct
governing the neutral's behavior.
A related issue is the appointment of an individual arbitrator to a
given case. In many court programs, the court or its ADR program
administrator select the neutral to serve in a given case." 5 In other pro-
grams, the design permits mutual selection of a neutral from the court's
roster." 16 Courts provide assistance through information relevant to the
selection process. In addition, parties can mutually agree on a neutral
outside the court roster. This guarantee of informed mutual party partici-
pation in selection of the neutral is not always present in adhesive,
employer-promulgated arbitration, although it is a requisite of the
Protocol. " I7
Yet another difference in dispute system design can be forum fees.
In court-annexed arbitration programs, taxpayers subsidize the program.
Courts employ ADR program administrators and usually absorb the cost
of administration." 8 For the arbitrator's fee, they choose among a mix
of options including a market rate, a fee set by the court, pro bono ser-
vice, or a mix of any of these, and they may divide the fee equally or
unequally among the parties. However, one clear rule is that a partici-
pant unable to afford the cost of ADR is excused from paying.I 'I One
study of arbitration in federal district courts found average arbitrator fees
and hearing costs of $125 to $300, depending on the number of arbitra-
tors, their fees, and whether they were paid per day or per case.' 2° In
contrast, some critics of unilaterally designed adhesive plans suggest
that designers choose a fee for the plan's ability to'deter claims.12 ' The
significant point is that the party in control of dispute system design can
also control forum costs. 12 2
A final difference that has provoked criticism of adhesive arbitra-
114. Id. at 72-74.
115. Id. at 70-72.
116. Id. at 69-70.
117. See Bickner et al., supra note 35, at 80.
118. NIEMIC ET AL., supra note 113, at 39.
119. Id. at 85-86.
120. Meierhoefer, supra note 103, at 4.
121. Public Citizen Congress Watch, supra note 96, at 1-3, 42 (reporting arbitration forum
costs ranging from $120 for a $2,500 claim to a possible $11,625 for a $80,000 claim).
122. If a party unilaterally designs an employment arbitration system so as to render forum
costs a barrier to access justice, courts may intervene. A recent empirical study finds evidence of
increased judicial willingness to eliminate cost as a barrier to private dispute resolution. Michael
H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Ever Green Tree of Compulsory Employment Arbitration? When
Cost Is an Unlawful Barrier to Private Dispute Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 19
(2001).
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tion is the substantial finality of arbitration awards and their limited
scope of review compared to de novo review in a trial court. 12 3 An arbi-
tration award can only be overturned on limited grounds, including stat-
utory grounds such as corruption, fraud, undue means, evident partiality,
and arbitrator misconduct or misbehavior. In addition, arbitration
awards sometimes can be overturned based on non-statutory grounds
such as public policy or manifest disregard of the law, and in a few
criticized cases, the arbitrary and capricious, or completely irrational
award.' 24 This means that an arbitration award is generally not subject
to vacatur for an error of law.' 25 Some commentators have argued that
this essentially privatizes what ought to be public justice and permits
parties to contract out of their obligation to comply with public policy as
embodied in statutes creating individual employment rights.126 Several
scholars have argued for broader judicial review of statutory employ-
ment rights issues in arbitration awards as a means of counteracting
employers' ability to contract out of compliance with public law. 127
123. See supra note 43 and authorities cited therein.
124. See generally Hayford, supra note 43 (examining statutory and non-statutory grounds for
vacating commercial arbitration awards); Hayford, "Manifest Disregard," supra note 43
(criticizing non-statutory expanded grounds for judicial review and arguing against judicial
inquiry into the merits of commercial arbitration awards); Hayford, Law in Disarray, supra note
43 (containing a comprehensive review); Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in the
Supreme Court 1983-1995: A Sea Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1996) (reviewing change
in Supreme Court attitude toward an embrace of commercial arbitration); Hayford & Kerrigan,
supra note 43.
125. Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules,
49 DUKE L.J. 1279 (2000) (describing the ability of parties and arbitrators to contract out of and
disregard mandatory rules including public law, and advocating tort liability for arbitrators who
decide a case in a manner that conflicts with mandatory rules of law).
126. Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice But By How Much? Questions Gilmer Did Not
Answer, 16 O1IO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 589 (2001) (using the decision principle of contracting
out of statutory responsibilities to create a framework for judicial control of adhesive employment
arbitration); Marcela Noemi Siderman, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements Worth Saving:
Reforming Arbitration to Accommodate Title VII Protections, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1885 (2000)
(arguing for increased judicial review and discovery, written opinions, the option of a jury trial,
access to information on arbitrators, and nonwaiveable remedies); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules
from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703 (1999)
(observing that arbitration does make privatizable vast areas of law); Richard C. Reuben, Public
Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577
(1997) (arguing that courts enforcing arbitration agreements are engaged in state action and that
ADR is an extension of the public justice system with the attendant need for due process
protections); Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993) (arguing for an expanded scope of judicial review of arbitration
awards to ensure the enforcement of public law).
127. Monica J. Washington, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes:
Judicial Review Without Judicial Reformation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 844 (1999) (arguing for broader
review). Even defenders of mandatory arbitration advocate compliance with public law. See
Sherwyn et al., supra note 4, at 126 (arguing for a Model Arbitration Act that would provide a
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Others have argued that mandatory binding arbitration may in some cir-
cumstances conflict with the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.' 28
In contrast, in court-annexed arbitration programs, arbitration is both
non-binding and subject to a de novo trial and full judicial review.
This section has illustrated how third party control over dispute
system design can affect choices about the resulting system. Designing a
system for resolving conflict is a quasi-legislative process. It is not sur-
prising that one's presence at, or absence from, the negotiating table at
which dispute system design choices are made should have an impact on
the resulting program. More public policy research is warranted on this
variable as a predictor of how the system functions and what outcomes it
produces.
CONCLUSION
Large, institutional organisms are arrogating all the choices about
the overall dispute system design to themselves, leaving little or no
room for the exercise of self-determination in dispute system design for
the individual employee or consumer disputant.' 29 Whether this is a
problem that we can or should regulate may be a function of the level of
self-determination that the resulting system leaves the individual
employee or consumer disputant within a given case using a specific
dispute resolution process. In mediation, disputants retain the choice to
walk away; they need not settle. In binding arbitration, there is no self-
determination as to outcome once the case goes to the arbitrator for deci-
sion. The key and unresolved empirical question is whether these sys-
tems operate in a fashion that represents systemic bias so disadvantaging
one disputant as effectively to deprive that party of legal rights the civil
justice system would otherwise protect. In other words, does the design
cross the boundary from process to substance? Does it move from
mechanism to ensure that arbitrators follow the applicable federal and state substantive law and
comply with statutorily prescribed damage provisions).
128. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIo ST. J. ON Dsp. RESOL. 669 (2001); Jean R. Stermlight,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A
Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L.
REV. 1 (1997).
129. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?, supra note 5, at 711 (criticizing Supreme
Court's preference for arbitration because allowing adhesive arbitration clauses permits "stronger
parties to take advantage of weaker parties" and noting that "[a] General Accounting Office report
concluded that most arbitrators who decided employment discrimination cases brought against the
securities industry were white males with an average age of 60") (citing General Accounting
Office, Pub. No. GAO/HEHS-94-17, Employment Discrimination: How Registered
Representatives Fare in Discrimination Disputes 2 (1994)); Sternlight, Simplicity vs. Fairness,
supra note 5, at 5 (discussing increased use of adhesive arbitration clauses in consumer contracts
and arguing the public may not be "better off' because of the trend).
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merely being a change of forum to changing the subject?' 30
For policy makers to decide this question, they will need considera-
bly more information on how these systems operate than we have right
now. Researchers have generally not compared different dispute system
designs. Confidentiality, privacy, and private forums make access to the
necessary data difficult and often impossible to get. This has implica-
tions for our evolving ADR ecosystem. Policy makers are making ADR
policy in the dark. A number of organisms can grow in the dark; some
even grow better in the dark. It is up to ADR service providers and
employers to provide access to researchers for better policy analysis of
these programs. A number of commentators have called for publication
and public access to written, reasoned arbitration awards as a regulatory
reform that could address some of the concerns regarding unilaterally
designed arbitration programs.' 3' Transparency and accountability are
powerful tools through which to shed light on our evolving private jus-
tice systems.
130. "In these cases we recognized that 'by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."' Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26
(1991) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 128
(1985)).
131. Christopher B. Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice: Why Public Law
Arbitrators Should be Required to Issue Written, Publishable Opinions, 4 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 285 (2000) (proposing legislation to require arbitrators to issue written, publishable
opinions that are publicly available to provide for dignity concerns of the parties, enhance
confidence in and stability of arbitration, provide predictability, and confer institutional benefits of
quality, legitimacy, and equal access to information, as well as public benefits of deterring wrong-
doing by employers); Adriaan Lanni, Protecting Public Rights in Private Arbitration: Cole v.
Bums International Security, 107 YALE L.J. 1157 (1998) (arguing for public disclosure of
arbitration awards).
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